23 ideas
19066 | Philosophy aims to understand the world, through ordinary experience and science [Dummett] |
8952 | We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher] |
19067 | A successful proof requires recognition of truth at every step [Dummett] |
19060 | Truth-tables are dubious in some cases, and may be a bad way to explain connective meaning [Dummett] |
8943 | Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher] |
8945 | Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher] |
11066 | Deduction is justified by the semantics of its metalanguage [Dummett, by Hanna] |
8951 | Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher] |
19058 | Syntactic consequence is positive, for validity; semantic version is negative, with counterexamples [Dummett] |
8950 | Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher] |
19063 | Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established [Dummett] |
19059 | In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1 [Dummett] |
19062 | Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions [Dummett] |
19065 | Soundness and completeness proofs test the theory of meaning, rather than the logic theory [Dummett] |
16210 | Humean supervenience says the world is just a vast mosaic of qualities in space-time [Lewis] |
8946 | We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher] |
8944 | Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher] |
8941 | We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher] |
8947 | If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher] |
8949 | In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher] |
19061 | An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question [Dummett] |
19064 | Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible [Dummett] |
9426 | The world is just a vast mosaic of little matters of local particular fact [Lewis] |