Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Philosophy of Logic', 'Treatise 4: The Moral Sense' and 'Philosophy and the Nature of Language'

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29 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
6253 Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson]
8952 We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
8943 Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
8945 Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
8951 Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
8950 Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
4568 If 'Queen of England' does not refer if there is no queen, its meaning can't refer if there is one [Cooper,DE]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
8946 We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
4574 If some peoples do not have categories like time or cause, they can't be essential features of rationality [Cooper,DE]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
8944 Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
8941 We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
8947 If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
8949 In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
4573 If it is claimed that language correlates with culture, we must be able to identify the two independently [Cooper,DE]
4575 A person's language doesn't prove their concepts, but how are concepts deduced apart from language? [Cooper,DE]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
4561 Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
4564 I can meaningfully speculate that humans may have experiences currently impossible for us [Cooper,DE]
4565 The verification principle itself seems neither analytic nor verifiable [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
4562 Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means [Cooper,DE]
4563 'How now brown cow?' is used for elocution, but this says nothing about its meaning [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
4571 Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair [Cooper,DE]
4566 Any thesis about reference is also a thesis about what exists to be referred to [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
4572 If predicates name things, that reduces every sentence to a mere list of names [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
4576 An analytic truth is one which becomes a logical truth when some synonyms have been replaced [Cooper,DE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
6256 Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
6252 Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
6257 You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
6254 We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson]
6255 Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson]