Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Philosophy of Logic', 'Treatise 4: The Moral Sense' and 'Naturalizing the Mind'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
6253 Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson]
8952 We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
8943 Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
8945 Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
8951 Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
8950 Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
8946 We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
8944 Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
8941 We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
8947 If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
8949 In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
5806 Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
5801 A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
5802 Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
5809 Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
5808 Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
5807 Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske]
5803 In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske]
5805 Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
5804 A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
5800 All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
6256 Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
6252 Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
6257 You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
6254 We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson]
6255 Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson]