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All the ideas for 'On the Philosophy of Logic', 'Metaphysical Dependence' and 'A world of truthmakers?'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
14092 Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
8952 We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
14100 Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
15549 If it were true that nothing at all existed, would that have a truthmaker? [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
8943 Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
8945 Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
8951 Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
8950 Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
14096 Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
14097 Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
14095 Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
8946 We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
14093 An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
8944 Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
14094 The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
8941 We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
8947 If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
8949 In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14101 Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
14099 'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
14098 An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen]