31 ideas
14092 | Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen] |
8952 | We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher] |
14100 | Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen] |
8943 | Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher] |
8945 | Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher] |
7785 | The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos] |
10699 | Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos] |
8951 | Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher] |
10225 | Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10736 | Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
10780 | Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
8950 | Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher] |
10697 | Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos] |
13671 | Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10267 | We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10698 | Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos] |
7806 | Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA] |
14096 | Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen] |
14097 | Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen] |
14095 | Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen] |
8946 | We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher] |
10700 | First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos] |
14093 | An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen] |
8944 | Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher] |
14094 | The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen] |
8941 | We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher] |
8947 | If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher] |
8949 | In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher] |
14101 | Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen] |
14099 | 'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen] |
14098 | An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen] |