21 ideas
8952 | We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher] |
8943 | Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher] |
8945 | Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher] |
8951 | Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher] |
8950 | Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher] |
14352 | '¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson] |
8946 | We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher] |
13095 | Essence is primitive force, or a law of change [Leibniz] |
8944 | Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher] |
8941 | We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher] |
14360 | Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson] |
14353 | Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson] |
14354 | When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson] |
14355 | (A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson] |
8947 | If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher] |
14358 | In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson] |
14359 | Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson] |
14357 | Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson] |
8949 | In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher] |
14356 | We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson] |
2117 | The connection in events enables us to successfully predict the future, so there must be a constant cause [Leibniz] |