28 ideas
| 8952 | We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher] |
| 8943 | Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher] |
| 8945 | Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher] |
| 8951 | Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher] |
| 8950 | Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher] |
| 4975 | A thought can be split in many ways, so that different parts appear as subject or predicate [Frege] |
| 16014 | It is controversial whether only 'numerical identity' allows two things to be counted as one [Noonan] |
| 9949 | There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object) [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 18995 | Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo] |
| 8946 | We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher] |
| 10317 | It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects [Frege, by Hale] |
| 10535 | Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 8944 | Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher] |
| 16024 | I could have died at five, but the summation of my adult stages could not [Noonan] |
| 16023 | Stage theorists accept four-dimensionalism, but call each stage a whole object [Noonan] |
| 16016 | Identity definitions (such as self-identity, or the smallest equivalence relation) are usually circular [Noonan] |
| 16017 | Identity is usually defined as the equivalence relation satisfying Leibniz's Law [Noonan] |
| 16015 | Problems about identity can't even be formulated without the concept of identity [Noonan] |
| 16020 | Identity can only be characterised in a second-order language [Noonan] |
| 16019 | Leibniz's Law must be kept separate from the substitutivity principle [Noonan] |
| 16018 | Indiscernibility is basic to our understanding of identity and distinctness [Noonan] |
| 8941 | We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher] |
| 8947 | If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher] |
| 8949 | In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher] |
| 9839 | Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 4973 | As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate [Frege] |
| 9167 | Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
| 4974 | For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege] |