Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Philosophy of Logic', 'Epistemic Justification' and 'Philosophy of Science'

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21 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
8952 We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
8943 Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
8945 Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
8951 Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
8950 Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
8946 We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
8944 Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
8941 We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
8947 If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
8949 In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19679 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
19678 Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
22189 Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham]
22190 If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
22192 Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham]
22194 Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham]
22195 Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
22197 Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham]
22196 For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / d. Consilience
22193 Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
22198 Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham]