Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Philosophy of Logic', 'On the Pragmatics of Communications' and 'In Defence of Pure Reason'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
3695 Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
8952 We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
3651 Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
3700 Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
8943 Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
8945 Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
8951 Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
8950 Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
8946 We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
8944 Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
8941 We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher]
3697 The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
8947 If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
8949 In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
3707 Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour]
3704 Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
3706 A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour]
3696 A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour]
3703 You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
3699 The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
3701 Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
3702 Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
3709 Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
3708 All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
15666 To understand language is to know how to use it to reach shared understandings [Habermas]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
3698 Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour]