Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Philosophy of Logic', 'Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction'' and 'Intro to 'Modality and Tense''

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33 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
9208 Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
10571 Concern for rigour can get in the way of understanding phenomena [Fine,K]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
8952 We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
8943 Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
8945 Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
10565 There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated [Fine,K]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
10564 We might combine the axioms of set theory with the axioms of mereology [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
8951 Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
8950 Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
10569 If you ask what F the second-order quantifier quantifies over, you treat it as first-order [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
10570 Assigning an entity to each predicate in semantics is largely a technical convenience [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
10573 Dedekind cuts lead to the bizarre idea that there are many different number 1's [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
10575 Why should a Dedekind cut correspond to a number? [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / l. Zero
10574 Unless we know whether 0 is identical with the null set, we create confusions [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
10560 Set-theoretic imperialists think sets can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
10568 Logicists say mathematics can be derived from definitions, and can be known that way [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
9210 Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
10563 A generative conception of abstracts proposes stages, based on concepts of previous objects [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
9211 A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
8946 We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
9202 Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
8944 Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
9206 We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
9205 The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
9209 Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
9200 Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
8941 We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
8947 If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
8949 In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
10561 Abstraction-theoretic imperialists think Fregean abstracts can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K]
10562 We can combine ZF sets with abstracts as urelements [Fine,K]
10567 We can create objects from conditions, rather than from concepts [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
9207 If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K]