49 ideas
| 8952 | We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher] |
| 8943 | Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher] |
| 8945 | Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher] |
| 8951 | Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher] |
| 8950 | Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher] |
| 17518 | Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers] |
| 17516 | If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers] |
| 17520 | Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers] |
| 8946 | We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher] |
| 17519 | To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers] |
| 17510 | Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers] |
| 17522 | We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers] |
| 17515 | Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers] |
| 17511 | Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers] |
| 17517 | Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers] |
| 17513 | If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers] |
| 8944 | Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher] |
| 17523 | Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers] |
| 17521 | You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers] |
| 17514 | Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers] |
| 17509 | Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers] |
| 17512 | If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers] |
| 8941 | We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher] |
| 8947 | If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher] |
| 8949 | In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher] |
| 17979 | Research shows perceptual discrimination is sharper at category boundaries [Murphy] |
| 18690 | Induction is said to just compare properties of categories, but the type of property also matters [Murphy] |
| 17980 | The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy] |
| 17973 | The theoretical and practical definitions for the classical view are very hard to find [Murphy] |
| 17969 | The classical definitional approach cannot distinguish typical and atypical category members [Murphy] |
| 17970 | Classical concepts follow classical logic, but concepts in real life don't work that way [Murphy] |
| 17971 | Classical concepts are transitive hierarchies, but actual categories may be intransitive [Murphy] |
| 17972 | The classical core is meant to be the real concept, but actually seems unimportant [Murphy] |
| 17975 | There is no 'ideal' bird or dog, and prototypes give no information about variability [Murphy] |
| 17976 | Prototypes are unified representations of the entire category (rather than of members) [Murphy] |
| 18691 | The prototype theory uses observed features, but can't include their construction [Murphy] |
| 17983 | The prototype theory handles hierarchical categories and combinations of concepts well [Murphy] |
| 17985 | Prototypes theory of concepts is best, as a full description with weighted typical features [Murphy] |
| 17986 | Learning concepts is forming prototypes with a knowledge structure [Murphy] |
| 17974 | The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototypes or exemplars [Murphy] |
| 17977 | The exemplar view of concepts says 'dogs' is the set of dogs I remember [Murphy] |
| 17982 | Exemplar theory struggles with hierarchical classification and with induction [Murphy] |
| 17981 | Children using knowing and essentialist categories doesn't fit the exemplar view [Murphy] |
| 17984 | Conceptual combination must be compositional, and can't be built up from exemplars [Murphy] |
| 17987 | The concept of birds from exemplars must also be used in inductions about birds [Murphy] |
| 17978 | We do not learn concepts in isolation, but as an integrated part of broader knowledge [Murphy] |
| 18687 | Concepts with familiar contents are easier to learn [Murphy] |
| 18688 | Some knowledge is involved in instant use of categories, other knowledge in explanations [Murphy] |
| 18689 | People categorise things consistent with their knowledge, even rejecting some good evidence [Murphy] |