Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Philosophy of Logic', 'Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed)' and 'Dispositional Essentialism Grounds Laws of Nature?'

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20 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
8952 We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
8943 Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
8945 Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
8951 Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
8950 Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
12394 If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
8946 We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
14292 Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
14347 A 'finkish' disposition is one that is lost immediately after the appropriate stimulus [Corry]
14348 An 'antidote' allows a manifestation to begin, but then blocks it [Corry]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
14350 If a disposition is never instantiated, it shouldn't be part of our theory of nature [Corry]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
8944 Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
8941 We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
8947 If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
8949 In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
14351 Maybe an experiment unmasks an essential disposition, and reveals its regularities [Corry]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
18749 Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
17646 Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
14346 Dispositional essentialism says fundamental laws of nature are strict, not ceteris paribus [Corry]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
4794 We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman]