Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Philosophy of Logic', 'Axioms for the Part Relation' and 'works'

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40 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
13736 Quinean metaphysics just lists the beings, which is a domain with no internal structure [Schaffer,J on Quine]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
8952 We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
8943 Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
8945 Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
3302 Set theory is full of Platonist metaphysics, so Quine aimed to keep it separate from logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
10211 Quine wants V = L for a cleaner theory, despite the scepticism of most theorists [Quine, by Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
3336 Two things can never entail three things [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
8951 Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
8950 Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
8453 If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
10311 No sense can be made of quantification into opaque contexts [Quine, by Hale]
10538 Finite quantification can be eliminated in favour of disjunction and conjunction [Quine, by Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
10793 Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal [Quine, by Marcus (Barcan)]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
8466 For Quine, intuitionist ontology is inadequate for classical mathematics [Quine, by Orenstein]
8467 Intuitionists only admit numbers properly constructed, but classical maths covers all reals in a 'limit' [Quine, by Orenstein]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
8946 We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
10667 A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible [Quine, by Hossack]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
16021 Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology) [Quine, by Noonan]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
3325 For Quine everything exists theoretically, as reference, predication and quantification [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
8534 Quine says the predicate of a true statement has no ontological implications [Quine, by Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
10295 Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets [Quine, by Shapiro]
3322 Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
6078 Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties [Quine, by McGinn]
8479 Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things' [Quine, by Orenstein]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
3751 Universals are acceptable if they are needed to make an accepted theory true [Quine, by Jacquette]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
7970 Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist [Quine, by Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
15783 Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist [Lycan on Quine]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
8944 Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
10650 In the military, persons are parts of parts of large units, but not parts of those large units [Rescher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
8941 We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher]
15782 Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia [Quine, by Lycan]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
8947 If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
8949 In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
2796 For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically [Quine, by Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
8450 Quine's empiricism is based on whole theoretical systems, not on single mental events [Quine, by Orenstein]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
3868 To proclaim cultural relativism is to thereby rise above it [Quine, by Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
4713 For Quine, theories are instruments used to make predictions about observations [Quine, by O'Grady]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
4712 Quine says there is no matter of fact about reference - it is 'inscrutable' [Quine, by O'Grady]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
7330 The principle of charity only applies to the logical constants [Quine, by Miller,A]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
17862 Essence gives an illusion of understanding [Quine, by Almog]