31 ideas
| 9136 | The paradox of analysis says that any conceptual analysis must be either trivial or false [Sorensen] |
| 8952 | We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher] |
| 9131 | Two long understandable sentences can have an unintelligible conjunction [Sorensen] |
| 9139 | If nothing exists, no truthmakers could make 'Nothing exists' true [Sorensen] |
| 9140 | Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'? [Sorensen] |
| 8943 | Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher] |
| 8945 | Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher] |
| 8951 | Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher] |
| 8950 | Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher] |
| 9119 | No attempt to deny bivalence has ever been accepted [Sorensen] |
| 9135 | We now see that generalizations use variables rather than abstract entities [Sorensen] |
| 9125 | Denying problems, or being romantically defeated by them, won't make them go away [Sorensen] |
| 9137 | Banning self-reference would outlaw 'This very sentence is in English' [Sorensen] |
| 9116 | Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen] |
| 8946 | We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher] |
| 16705 | Whiteness isn't created in an alteration, because it is just this-being-white [Oresme] |
| 9132 | An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or' [Sorensen] |
| 8944 | Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher] |
| 8941 | We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher] |
| 8947 | If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher] |
| 8949 | In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher] |
| 9128 | It is propositional attitudes which can be a priori, not the propositions themselves [Sorensen] |
| 9130 | Attributing apriority to a proposition is attributing a cognitive ability to someone [Sorensen] |
| 9118 | The colour bands of the spectrum arise from our biology; they do not exist in the physics [Sorensen] |
| 9124 | We are unable to perceive a nose (on the back of a mask) as concave [Sorensen] |
| 9126 | Bayesians build near-certainty from lots of reasonably probable beliefs [Sorensen] |
| 9121 | Illusions are not a reason for skepticism, but a source of interesting scientific information [Sorensen] |
| 9134 | The negation of a meaningful sentence must itself be meaningful [Sorensen] |
| 9133 | Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences [Sorensen] |
| 9129 | I can buy any litre of water, but not every litre of water [Sorensen] |
| 9122 | God cannot experience unwanted pain, so God cannot understand human beings [Sorensen] |