86 ideas
| 5333 | Philosophy needs wisdom about who we are, as well as how we ought to be [Flanagan] |
| 2512 | Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language [Wittgenstein] |
| 4148 | What is your aim in philosophy? - To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle [Wittgenstein] |
| 22490 | Bring words back from metaphysics to everyday use [Wittgenstein] |
| 5334 | We resist science partly because it can't provide ethical wisdom [Flanagan] |
| 8952 | We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher] |
| 6566 | The problem is to explain the role of contradiction in social life [Wittgenstein] |
| 8943 | Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher] |
| 8945 | Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher] |
| 8951 | Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher] |
| 8950 | Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher] |
| 18743 | Wittgenstein says we want the grammar of problems, not their first-order logical structure [Wittgenstein, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 4139 | Naming is a preparation for description [Wittgenstein] |
| 4946 | A name is not determined by a description, but by a cluster or family [Wittgenstein, by Kripke] |
| 8946 | We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher] |
| 8944 | Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher] |
| 15106 | Essence is expressed by grammar [Wittgenstein] |
| 8941 | We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher] |
| 8947 | If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher] |
| 8949 | In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher] |
| 6600 | The belief that fire burns is like the fear that it burns [Wittgenstein] |
| 4153 | Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made? [Wittgenstein] |
| 6501 | As sense-data are necessarily private, they are attacked by Wittgenstein's objections [Wittgenstein, by Robinson,H] |
| 11079 | How do I decide when to accept or obey an intuition? [Wittgenstein] |
| 4160 | One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's own beliefs [Wittgenstein] |
| 5340 | Explanation does not entail prediction [Flanagan] |
| 5346 | In the 17th century a collisionlike view of causation made mental causation implausible [Flanagan] |
| 19273 | I don't have the opinion that people have minds; I just treat them as such [Wittgenstein] |
| 5663 | It is irresponsible to generalise from my own case of pain to other people's [Wittgenstein] |
| 19272 | To imagine another's pain by my own, I must imagine a pain I don't feel, by one I do feel [Wittgenstein] |
| 4161 | If a lion could talk, we could not understand him [Wittgenstein] |
| 7392 | If a lion could talk, it would be nothing like other lions [Dennett on Wittgenstein] |
| 5341 | Only you can have your subjective experiences because only you are hooked up to your nervous system [Flanagan] |
| 5676 | To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein] |
| 5351 | We only have a sense of our self as continuous, not as exactly the same [Flanagan] |
| 5353 | The self is an abstraction which magnifies important aspects of autobiography [Flanagan] |
| 5354 | We are not born with a self; we develop a self through living [Flanagan] |
| 5349 | For Buddhists a fixed self is a morally dangerous illusion [Flanagan] |
| 5338 | Normal free will claims control of what I do, but a stronger view claims control of thought and feeling [Flanagan] |
| 5344 | Free will is held to give us a whole list of desirable capacities for living [Flanagan] |
| 5332 | People believe they have free will that circumvents natural law, but only an incorporeal mind could do this [Flanagan] |
| 5345 | We only think of ourselves as having free will because we first thought of God that way [Flanagan] |
| 5343 | People largely came to believe in dualism because it made human agents free [Flanagan] |
| 5347 | Behaviourism notoriously has nothing to say about mental causation [Flanagan] |
| 5339 | Cars and bodies obey principles of causation, without us knowing any 'strict laws' about them [Flanagan] |
| 4154 | Why are we not aware of the huge gap between mind and brain in ordinary life? [Wittgenstein] |
| 5342 | Physicalism doesn't deny that the essence of an experience is more than its neural realiser [Flanagan] |
| 5335 | Emotions are usually very apt, rather than being non-rational and fickle [Flanagan] |
| 6165 | Every course of action can either accord or conflict with a rule, so there is no accord or conflict [Wittgenstein] |
| 4143 | One cannot obey a rule 'privately', because that is a practice, not the same as thinking one is obeying [Wittgenstein] |
| 7092 | If individuals can't tell if they are following a rule, how does a community do it? [Grayling on Wittgenstein] |
| 4158 | An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria [Wittgenstein] |
| 4138 | Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow? [Wittgenstein] |
| 7055 | Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Heil] |
| 12576 | Possessing a concept is knowing how to go on [Wittgenstein, by Peacocke] |
| 4157 | Concepts direct our interests and investigations, and express those interests [Wittgenstein] |
| 12606 | Man learns the concept of the past by remembering [Wittgenstein] |
| 4141 | Various games have a 'family resemblance', as their similarities overlap and criss-cross [Wittgenstein] |
| 23450 | Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
| 4150 | Asking about verification is only one way of asking about the meaning of a proposition [Wittgenstein] |
| 6567 | For Wittgenstein, words are defined by their use, just as chess pieces are [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
| 6169 | We do not achieve meaning and understanding in our heads, but in the world [Wittgenstein, by Rowlands] |
| 4155 | We all seem able to see quite clearly how sentences represent things when we use them [Wittgenstein] |
| 4137 | In the majority of cases the meaning of a word is its use in the language [Wittgenstein] |
| 4142 | To understand a sentence means to understand a language [Wittgenstein] |
| 4149 | We don't have 'meanings' in our minds in addition to verbal expressions [Wittgenstein] |
| 4156 | Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here" [Wittgenstein] |
| 4145 | How do words refer to sensations? [Wittgenstein] |
| 4140 | The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long [Wittgenstein] |
| 4136 | To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life [Wittgenstein] |
| 6166 | Was Wittgenstein's problem between individual and community, or between occasions for an individual? [Rowlands on Wittgenstein] |
| 7875 | If a brilliant child invented a name for a private sensation, it couldn't communicate it [Wittgenstein] |
| 4146 | We cannot doublecheck mental images for correctness (or confirm news with many copies of the paper) [Wittgenstein] |
| 4147 | If we only named pain by our own case, it would be like naming beetles by looking in a private box [Wittgenstein] |
| 5659 | If the reference is private, that is incompatible with the sense being public [Wittgenstein, by Scruton] |
| 4152 | Getting from perceptions to words cannot be a private matter; the rules need an institution of use [Wittgenstein] |
| 4144 | Common human behaviour enables us to interpret an unknown language [Wittgenstein] |
| 11049 | To communicate, language needs agreement in judgment as well as definition [Wittgenstein] |
| 6658 | What is left over if I subtract my arm going up from my raising my arm? [Wittgenstein] |
| 5348 | Intellectualism admires the 'principled actor', non-intellectualism admires the 'good character' [Flanagan] |
| 5355 | Cognitivists think morals are discovered by reason [Flanagan] |
| 5336 | Ethics is the science of the conditions that lead to human flourishing [Flanagan] |
| 5350 | The Hindu doctrine of reincarnation only appeared in the eighth century CE [Flanagan] |
| 4151 | Grammar tells what kind of object anything is - and theology is a kind of grammar [Wittgenstein] |
| 4159 | The human body is the best picture of the human soul [Wittgenstein] |
| 5352 | The idea of the soul gets some support from the scientific belief in essential 'natural kinds' [Flanagan] |