Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Philosophy of Logic', 'Truth' and 'An Outline of Philosophy'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world [Strawson,P]
Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say [Strawson,P]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
The statement that it is raining perfectly fits the fact that it is raining [Strawson,P]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement [Strawson,P]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
I doubt whether ethics is part of philosophy [Russell]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval [Russell]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Unlike hate, all desires can be satisfied by love [Russell]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Goodness is a combination of love and knowledge [Russell]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
In wartime, happiness is hating the enemy, because it gives the war a purpose [Russell]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Originally virtue was obedience, to gods, government, or custom [Russell]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires [Russell]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / d. Reform of offenders
Legally curbing people's desires is inferior to improving their desires [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
We could be aware of time if senses briefly vibrated, extending their experience of movement [Russell, by Bardon]