Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Philosophy of Logic', 'On Referring' and 'Philosophical Insignificance of A Priori Knowledge'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
There are no rules for the exact logic of ordinary language, because that doesn't exist [Strawson,P]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
'The present King of France is bald' presupposes existence, rather than stating it [Strawson,P, by Grayling]
Russell asks when 'The King of France is wise' would be a true assertion [Strawson,P]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
The meaning of an expression or sentence is general directions for its use, to refer or to assert [Strawson,P]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
Reference is mainly a social phenomenon [Strawson,P, by Sainsbury]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
If an expression can refer to anything, it may still instrinsically refer, but relative to a context [Bach on Strawson,P]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Expressions don't refer; people use expressions to refer [Strawson,P]
If an utterance fails to refer then it is a pseudo-use, though a speaker may think they assert something [Strawson,P]