75 ideas
| 8952 | We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher] |
| 14227 | We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise' [Inwagen] |
| 8943 | Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher] |
| 8945 | Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher] |
| 10662 | Mereology is 'nihilistic' (just atoms) or 'universal' (no restrictions on what is 'whole') [Inwagen, by Varzi] |
| 8951 | Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher] |
| 8950 | Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher] |
| 17587 | The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false [Inwagen] |
| 17558 | Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters [Inwagen] |
| 17583 | There are no heaps [Inwagen] |
| 16588 | I prefer a lack of form to mean non-existence, than to think of some quasi-existence [Augustine] |
| 17578 | I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen] |
| 22979 | Three main questions seem to be whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort it is [Augustine] |
| 17582 | Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague [Inwagen] |
| 8946 | We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher] |
| 17556 | Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff [Inwagen] |
| 8264 | Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables [Inwagen, by Lowe] |
| 17565 | Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible [Inwagen] |
| 14228 | If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction [Liggins on Inwagen] |
| 14468 | Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them [Inwagen] |
| 17571 | Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple [Inwagen] |
| 17562 | The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump [Inwagen] |
| 17574 | If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations [Inwagen] |
| 8944 | Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher] |
| 17531 | I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples' [Inwagen] |
| 17560 | If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object? [Inwagen] |
| 17561 | If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things [Inwagen] |
| 17566 | I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship [Inwagen] |
| 14230 | We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Inwagen, by Liggins] |
| 17557 | Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something? [Inwagen] |
| 17564 | The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen] |
| 17575 | The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings [Inwagen] |
| 17577 | When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron? [Inwagen] |
| 17589 | If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem [Inwagen] |
| 17588 | We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen] |
| 8941 | We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher] |
| 8947 | If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher] |
| 8949 | In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher] |
| 17572 | Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen] |
| 17579 | Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen] |
| 17590 | A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen] |
| 17591 | Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen] |
| 22981 | Mind and memory are the same, as shown in 'bear it in mind' or 'it slipped from mind' [Augustine] |
| 22980 | Memory contains innumerable principles of maths, as well as past sense experiences [Augustine] |
| 22983 | We would avoid remembering sorrow or fear if that triggered the emotions afresh [Augustine] |
| 22977 | I can distinguish different smells even when I am not experiencing them [Augustine] |
| 22982 | Why does joy in my mind make me happy, but joy in my memory doesn't? [Augustine] |
| 22978 | Memory is so vast that I cannot recognise it as part of my mind [Augustine] |
| 22984 | Without memory I could not even speak of myself [Augustine] |
| 5982 | If the future does not exist, how can prophets see it? [Augustine] |
| 22976 | Memories are preserved separately, according to category [Augustine] |
| 22985 | Everyone wants happiness [Augustine] |
| 17563 | The strong force pulls, but also pushes apart if nucleons get too close together [Inwagen] |
| 5984 | Maybe time is an extension of the mind [Augustine] |
| 22888 | To be aware of time it can only exist in the mind, as memory or anticipation [Augustine, by Bardon] |
| 5980 | How can ten days ahead be a short time, if it doesn't exist? [Augustine] |
| 5979 | If the past is no longer, and the future is not yet, how can they exist? [Augustine] |
| 5981 | The whole of the current year is not present, so how can it exist? [Augustine] |
| 5978 | I know what time is, until someone asks me to explain it [Augustine] |
| 5983 | I disagree with the idea that time is nothing but cosmic movement [Augustine] |
| 5977 | Heaven and earth must be created, because they are subject to change [Augustine] |
| 17559 | Is one atom a piece of gold, or is a sizable group of atoms required? [Inwagen] |
| 17586 | At the lower level, life trails off into mere molecular interaction [Inwagen] |
| 17567 | A flame is like a life, but not nearly so well individuated [Inwagen] |
| 17576 | If God were to 'reassemble' my atoms of ten years ago, the result would certainly not be me [Inwagen] |
| 17580 | One's mental and other life is centred on the brain, unlike any other part of the body [Inwagen] |
| 17568 | A tumour may spread a sort of life, but it is not a life, or an organism [Inwagen] |
| 17581 | Being part of an organism's life is a matter of degree, and vague [Inwagen] |
| 17584 | Some events are only borderline cases of lives [Inwagen] |
| 17569 | Unlike waves, lives are 'jealous'; it is almost impossible for them to overlap [Inwagen] |
| 17570 | The chemical reactions in a human life involve about sixteen elements [Inwagen] |
| 17585 | Life is vague at both ends, but could it be totally vague? [Inwagen] |
| 22887 | If God existed before creation, why would a perfect being desire to change things? [Augustine, by Bardon] |
| 5976 | If God is outside time in eternity, can He hear prayers? [Augustine] |
| 17573 | There is no reason to think that mere existence is a valuable thing [Inwagen] |