Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Philosophy of Logic', 'The Basing Relation' and 'Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths'

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30 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
ZFC set theory has only 'pure' sets, without 'urelements' [Reck/Price]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Three types of variable in second-order logic, for objects, functions, and predicates/sets [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
Mereological arithmetic needs infinite objects, and function definitions [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
Peano Arithmetic can have three second-order axioms, plus '1' and 'successor' [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Set-theory gives a unified and an explicit basis for mathematics [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Structuralism emerged from abstract algebra, axioms, and set theory and its structures [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / b. Varieties of structuralism
Relativist Structuralism just stipulates one successful model as its arithmetic [Reck/Price]
There are 'particular' structures, and 'universal' structures (what the former have in common) [Reck/Price]
Pattern Structuralism studies what isomorphic arithmetic models have in common [Reck/Price]
There are Formalist, Relativist, Universalist and Pattern structuralism [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price]
Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
Universalist Structuralism is based on generalised if-then claims, not one particular model [Reck/Price]
Universalist Structuralism eliminates the base element, as a variable, which is then quantified out [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
The existence of an infinite set is assumed by Relativist Structuralism [Reck/Price]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
A nominalist might avoid abstract objects by just appealing to mereological sums [Reck/Price]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
There are reasons 'for which' a belief is held, reasons 'why' it is believed, and reasons 'to' believe it [Neta]
The basing relation of a reason to a belief should both support and explain the belief [Neta]