57 ideas
| 21634 | Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like [Hofweber] |
| 21666 | 'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure [Hofweber] |
| 5750 | Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia] |
| 8952 | We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher] |
| 21640 | 'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely' [Hofweber] |
| 5737 | Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia] |
| 5744 | First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia] |
| 8943 | Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher] |
| 8945 | Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher] |
| 8951 | Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher] |
| 21657 | Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types' [Hofweber] |
| 8950 | Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher] |
| 21653 | Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber] |
| 21636 | 'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases [Hofweber] |
| 21637 | If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities [Hofweber] |
| 21643 | The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality [Hofweber] |
| 5740 | Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia] |
| 5741 | If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia] |
| 21644 | Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols [Hofweber] |
| 21646 | The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words [Hofweber] |
| 21665 | The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes [Hofweber] |
| 21649 | How can words be used for counting if they are objects? [Hofweber] |
| 21647 | Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought [Hofweber] |
| 21648 | Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities [Hofweber] |
| 21664 | Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together [Hofweber] |
| 21660 | Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things [Hofweber] |
| 5736 | No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia] |
| 21661 | There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us [Hofweber] |
| 5735 | Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia] |
| 8946 | We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher] |
| 21652 | Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise [Hofweber] |
| 8944 | Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher] |
| 5746 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia] |
| 5738 | We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia] |
| 5732 | 'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia] |
| 5739 | Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia] |
| 8941 | We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher] |
| 8947 | If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher] |
| 8949 | In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher] |
| 21663 | Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber] |
| 5734 | Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia] |
| 5742 | In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia] |
| 5743 | If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia] |
| 5749 | Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia] |
| 5751 | The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia] |
| 21654 | The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber] |
| 5748 | We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia] |
| 21641 | Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world [Hofweber] |
| 21638 | Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions [Hofweber] |
| 21658 | Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them [Hofweber] |
| 21659 | 'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties [Hofweber] |
| 21655 | Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence [Hofweber] |
| 21656 | Proposition have no content, because they are content [Hofweber] |
| 21635 | Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires [Hofweber] |
| 21662 | Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber] |
| 21645 | 'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense [Hofweber] |
| 21639 | 'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer [Hofweber] |