37 ideas
| 8952 | We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher] |
| 14415 | A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks] |
| 14408 | Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks] |
| 14395 | If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks] |
| 14398 | Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks] |
| 14403 | If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks] |
| 14397 | Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks] |
| 14396 | If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks] |
| 14400 | If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks] |
| 14394 | It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks] |
| 14390 | Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks] |
| 14412 | Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks] |
| 14414 | I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks] |
| 14418 | Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks] |
| 14391 | If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks] |
| 14419 | Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks] |
| 8943 | Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher] |
| 8945 | Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher] |
| 8951 | Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher] |
| 8950 | Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher] |
| 14393 | The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths [Merricks] |
| 22626 | Process philosophy insists that processes are not inferior in being to substances [Rescher] |
| 8946 | We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher] |
| 14413 | Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed [Merricks] |
| 14416 | An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false [Merricks] |
| 14392 | Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks] |
| 8944 | Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher] |
| 14410 | You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs [Merricks] |
| 8941 | We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher] |
| 8947 | If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher] |
| 8949 | In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher] |
| 14417 | Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks] |
| 14402 | If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks] |
| 14406 | Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous [Merricks] |
| 14407 | Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist' [Merricks] |
| 14411 | Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it [Merricks] |
| 14405 | How can a presentist explain an object's having existed? [Merricks] |