37 ideas
21829 | Philosophy aims to understand how things (broadly understood) hang together (broadly understood) [Sellars] |
8952 | We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher] |
8943 | Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher] |
8945 | Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher] |
15845 | It seems absurd that seeing a person's limbs, the one is many, and yet the many are one [Plato] |
8951 | Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher] |
8950 | Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher] |
9867 | It is absurd to define a circle, but not be able to recognise a real one [Plato] |
9865 | Daily arithmetic counts unequal things, but pure arithmetic equalises them [Plato] |
6550 | Reduction requires that an object's properties consist of its constituents' properties and relations [Sellars] |
14503 | If a mixture does not contain measure and proportion, it is corrupted and destroyed [Plato] |
15857 | Any mixture which lacks measure and proportion doesn't even count as a mixture at all [Plato] |
8946 | We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher] |
4447 | If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato] |
15856 | A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it [Plato] |
8944 | Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher] |
374 | If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one [Plato] |
8941 | We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher] |
8947 | If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher] |
8949 | In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher] |
389 | How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant? [Plato] |
390 | If goodness involves moderation and proportion, then it seems to be found in beauty [Plato] |
391 | The good involves beauty, proportion and truth [Plato] |
392 | Neither intellect nor pleasure are the good, because they are not perfect and self-sufficient [Plato] |
393 | Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure [Plato, by PG] |
385 | Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false [Plato] |
387 | A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain [Plato] |
373 | Pleasure is certainly very pleasant, but it doesn't follow that all pleasures are good [Plato] |
379 | The good must be sufficient and perfect, and neither intellect nor pleasure are that [Plato] |
371 | Reason, memory, truth and wisdom are far better than pleasure, for those who can attain them [Plato] |
376 | Would you prefer a life of pleasure without reason, or one of reason without pleasure? [Plato] |
382 | It is unlikely that the gods feel either pleasure or pain [Plato] |
381 | We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony [Plato] |
386 | Intense pleasure and pain are not felt in a good body, but in a worthless one [Plato] |
388 | Hedonists must say that someone in pain is bad, even if they are virtuous [Plato] |
377 | If you lived a life of maximum pleasure, would you still be lacking anything? [Plato] |
378 | A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is the life of a jellyfish [Plato] |