Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Philosophy of Logic', 'Vagaries of Definition' and 'Modal Logics and Philosophy'

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28 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Propositional logic handles negation, disjunction, conjunction; predicate logic adds quantifiers, predicates, relations [Girle]
There are three axiom schemas for propositional logic [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
Proposition logic has definitions for its three operators: or, and, and identical [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Axiom systems of logic contain axioms, inference rules, and definitions of proof and theorems [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
There are seven modalities in S4, each with its negation [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
◊p → □◊p is the hallmark of S5 [Girle]
S5 has just six modalities, and all strings can be reduced to those [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
Possible worlds logics use true-in-a-world rather than true [Girle]
Modal logic has four basic modal negation equivalences [Girle]
Modal logics were studied in terms of axioms, but now possible worlds semantics is added [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 7. Strict Implication
Necessary implication is called 'strict implication'; if successful, it is called 'entailment' [Girle]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 5. Tableau Proof
If an argument is invalid, a truth tree will indicate a counter-example [Girle]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
All the arithmetical entities can be reduced to classes of integers, and hence to sets [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Analytic truths are divided into logically and conceptually necessary [Girle]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Possibilities can be logical, theoretical, physical, economic or human [Girle]
We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
A world has 'access' to a world it generates, which is important in possible worlds semantics [Girle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine]