31 ideas
17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
8952 | We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher] |
17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
8943 | Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher] |
8945 | Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher] |
8951 | Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher] |
8950 | Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher] |
7755 | Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc. [Lycan] |
17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
8946 | We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher] |
17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
8944 | Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher] |
17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
8941 | We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher] |
8947 | If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher] |
8949 | In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher] |
17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
7768 | The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation [Lycan] |
7766 | Meaning must be known before we can consider verification [Lycan] |
7763 | It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name [Lycan] |
7764 | Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it? [Lycan] |
7770 | Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' [Lycan] |
7773 | A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true [Lycan] |
7774 | Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation [Lycan] |
17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |