Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Actions', 'Contingent Identity' and 'Criterion of Validity in Reasoning'

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19 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
14779 I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
14777 That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
14780 Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
14778 Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
14064 If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard]
14066 A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard]
14067 Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard]
14069 We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
14076 Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14077 Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
14070 A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14073 Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
14065 Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
14074 Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
14072 Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard]
14078 Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
14079 Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14071 Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 5. Action as Trying
20082 Bodily movements are not actions, which are really the tryings within bodily movement [Hornsby, by Stout,R]