Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Actions', 'Mental Content' and 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 2: Senses'

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23 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
23634 Accepting the existence of anything presupposes the notion of existence [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
23635 Truths are self-evident to sensible persons who understand them clearly without prejudice [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
7631 Sensation is not committed to any external object, but perception is [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
23637 Primary qualities are the object of mathematics [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
23638 Secondary qualities conjure up, and are confused with, the sensations which produce them [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
23639 It is unclear whether a toothache is in the mind or in the tooth, but the word has a single meaning [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
6492 Reid is seen as the main direct realist of the eighteenth century [Reid, by Robinson,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
23641 People dislike believing without evidence, and try to avoid it [Reid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
23642 If non-rational evidence reaches us, it is reason which then makes use of it [Reid]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
23805 Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
23806 Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte]
23793 On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte]
23796 Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte]
23792 Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte]
23795 Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte]
23804 Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
23802 Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
23797 Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 11. Teleological Semantics
23799 Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte]
23800 Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
23798 Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
23640 Only mature minds can distinguish the qualities of a body [Reid]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 5. Action as Trying
20082 Bodily movements are not actions, which are really the tryings within bodily movement [Hornsby, by Stout,R]