14 ideas
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
12756 | Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
12755 | Final causes can help with explanations in physics [Leibniz] |
12760 | Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
20082 | Bodily movements are not actions, which are really the tryings within bodily movement [Hornsby, by Stout,R] |
12759 | There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz] |
12718 | Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz] |
11854 | If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz] |
12758 | It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz] |
19408 | To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz] |