17 ideas
9295 | Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann] |
5662 | Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer] |
5664 | Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer] |
5668 | People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer] |
5661 | We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer] |
5665 | Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer] |
5666 | Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer] |
5669 | Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer] |
9293 | Body-spirit interaction ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world [Teichmann] |
22465 | We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot] |
22466 | We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot] |
22467 | Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot] |
22470 | A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot] |
22468 | Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot] |
22469 | Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot] |
9292 | The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) [Teichmann] |
9294 | No individuating marks distinguish between Souls [Teichmann] |