12 ideas
| 9295 | Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann] |
| 16669 | Everything that exists is either a being, or some mode of a being [Malebranche] |
| 7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 9293 | Body-spirit interaction ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world [Teichmann] |
| 12726 | In a true cause we see a necessary connection [Malebranche] |
| 9292 | The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) [Teichmann] |
| 9294 | No individuating marks distinguish between Souls [Teichmann] |