18 ideas
16405 | To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker] |
9295 | Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann] |
16407 | Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker] |
16397 | If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker] |
16398 | Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker] |
16399 | Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker] |
16396 | Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker] |
16408 | Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker] |
9329 | Justification is coherence with a background system; if irrefutable, it is knowledge [Lehrer] |
9330 | Generalization seems to be more fundamental to minds than spotting similarities [Lehrer] |
9328 | All conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them [Lehrer] |
9293 | Body-spirit interaction ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world [Teichmann] |
16406 | If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker] |
16404 | In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker] |
16403 | 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker] |
16401 | To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker] |
9294 | No individuating marks distinguish between Souls [Teichmann] |
9292 | The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) [Teichmann] |