17 ideas
| 12270 | Being is one [Melissus, by Aristotle] |
| 19520 | Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee] |
| 19522 | More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee] |
| 19521 | If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee] |
| 19523 | Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee] |
| 5901 | Is 'productive of happiness' the definition of 'right', or the cause of it? [Ross on Bentham] |
| 5934 | Of Bentham's 'dimensions' of pleasure, only intensity and duration matter [Ross on Bentham] |
| 3777 | Pleasure and pain control all human desires and duties [Bentham] |
| 3554 | Bentham thinks happiness is feeling good, but why use morality to achieve that? [Annas on Bentham] |
| 3781 | The value of pleasures and pains is their force [Bentham] |
| 3778 | The community's interest is a sum of individual interests [Bentham] |
| 20280 | Large mature animals are more rational than babies. But all that really matters is - can they suffer? [Bentham] |
| 3779 | Unnatural, when it means anything, means infrequent [Bentham] |
| 3059 | There is no real motion, only the appearance of it [Melissus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 5100 | The void is not required for change, because a plenum can alter in quality [Aristotle on Melissus] |
| 456 | Nothing could come out of nothing [Melissus] |
| 3780 | We must judge a thing morally to know if it conforms to God's will [Bentham] |