Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Constitutional Code I', 'Maths as a Science of Patterns' and 'The Central Questions of Philosophy'

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22 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Axioms are often affirmed simply because they produce results which have been accepted [Resnik]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematical realism says that maths exists, is largely true, and is independent of proofs [Resnik]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Mathematical constants and quantifiers only exist as locations within structures or patterns [Resnik]
Sets are positions in patterns [Resnik]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
Structuralism must explain why a triangle is a whole, and not a random set of points [Resnik]
There are too many mathematical objects for them all to be mental or physical [Resnik]
Maths is pattern recognition and representation, and its truth and proofs are based on these [Resnik]
Congruence is the strongest relationship of patterns, equivalence comes next, and mutual occurrence is the weakest [Resnik]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer]
Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer]
Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer]
Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Prejudice apart, push-pin has equal value with music and poetry [Bentham]