35 ideas
19066 | Philosophy aims to understand the world, through ordinary experience and science [Dummett] |
19067 | A successful proof requires recognition of truth at every step [Dummett] |
19060 | Truth-tables are dubious in some cases, and may be a bad way to explain connective meaning [Dummett] |
11066 | Deduction is justified by the semantics of its metalanguage [Dummett, by Hanna] |
19058 | Syntactic consequence is positive, for validity; semantic version is negative, with counterexamples [Dummett] |
19063 | Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established [Dummett] |
19059 | In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1 [Dummett] |
19062 | Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions [Dummett] |
19065 | Soundness and completeness proofs test the theory of meaning, rather than the logic theory [Dummett] |
9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
19061 | An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question [Dummett] |
8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
19064 | Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible [Dummett] |
8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
5901 | Is 'productive of happiness' the definition of 'right', or the cause of it? [Ross on Bentham] |
5934 | Of Bentham's 'dimensions' of pleasure, only intensity and duration matter [Ross on Bentham] |
3777 | Pleasure and pain control all human desires and duties [Bentham] |
3781 | The value of pleasures and pains is their force [Bentham] |
3554 | Bentham thinks happiness is feeling good, but why use morality to achieve that? [Annas on Bentham] |
3778 | The community's interest is a sum of individual interests [Bentham] |
20280 | Large mature animals are more rational than babies. But all that really matters is - can they suffer? [Bentham] |
3779 | Unnatural, when it means anything, means infrequent [Bentham] |
8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |
3780 | We must judge a thing morally to know if it conforms to God's will [Bentham] |