Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation', 'Spheres of Justice' and 'Necessity and Non-Existence'

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28 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
15063 Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
15078 There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
15072 Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
15071 Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
15075 Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
15065 What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
15076 Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
15073 Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
15074 We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
15064 Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
15070 It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15068 The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K]
15069 Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
5901 Is 'productive of happiness' the definition of 'right', or the cause of it? [Ross on Bentham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
5934 Of Bentham's 'dimensions' of pleasure, only intensity and duration matter [Ross on Bentham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
3777 Pleasure and pain control all human desires and duties [Bentham]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
3554 Bentham thinks happiness is feeling good, but why use morality to achieve that? [Annas on Bentham]
3781 The value of pleasures and pains is their force [Bentham]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
20595 You can't distribute goods from behind a veil, because their social meaning is unclear [Walzer, by Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
3778 The community's interest is a sum of individual interests [Bentham]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
20592 Complex equality restricts equalities from spilling over, like money influencing politics and law [Walzer, by Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
20549 Equality is complex, with different spheres of equality where different principles apply [Walzer, by Swift]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
20280 Large mature animals are more rational than babies. But all that really matters is - can they suffer? [Bentham]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
3779 Unnatural, when it means anything, means infrequent [Bentham]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
15067 A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K]
15077 It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
15066 B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
3780 We must judge a thing morally to know if it conforms to God's will [Bentham]