Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Anarchical Fallacies: on the Declaration of Rights', 'How Things Might Have Been' and 'Monadology'

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39 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
4642 No fact can be real and no proposition true unless there is a Sufficient Reason (even if we can't know it) [Leibniz]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
2115 Everything in the universe is interconnected, so potentially a mind could know everything [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
2111 Falsehood involves a contradiction, and truth is contradictory of falsehood [Leibniz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
7644 The monad idea incomprehensibly spiritualises matter, instead of materialising soul [La Mettrie on Leibniz]
11857 He replaced Aristotelian continuants with monads [Leibniz, by Wiggins]
7843 Is a drop of urine really an infinity of thinking monads? [Voltaire on Leibniz]
12751 It is unclear in 'Monadology' how extended bodies relate to mind-like monads. [Garber on Leibniz]
19363 Changes in a monad come from an internal principle, and the diversity within its substance [Leibniz]
19352 A 'monad' has basic perception and appetite; a 'soul' has distinct perception and memory [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
11897 A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P]
11898 Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11883 A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
7931 If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity [Leibniz, by Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11889 Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11877 An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
11882 No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
11886 There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11909 Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P]
11899 Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
11906 The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11894 Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
17554 There must be some internal difference between any two beings in nature [Leibniz]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
2112 Truths of reason are known by analysis, and are necessary; facts are contingent, and their opposites possible [Leibniz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11887 Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11890 De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
11892 Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
11893 Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
11884 The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
9344 Mathematical analysis ends in primitive principles, which cannot be and need not be demonstrated [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
2110 We all expect the sun to rise tomorrow by experience, but astronomers expect it by reason [Leibniz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
11905 Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
2109 Increase a conscious machine to the size of a mill - you still won't see perceptions in it [Leibniz]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
19362 We know the 'I' and its contents by abstraction from awareness of necessary truths [Leibniz]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
20977 Natural rights are nonsense, and unspecified natural rights is nonsense on stilts [Bentham]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
21003 Only laws can produce real rights; rights from 'law of nature' are imaginary [Bentham]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
12707 The true elements are atomic monads [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
11907 Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
2114 This is the most perfect possible universe, in its combination of variety with order [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
2113 God alone (the Necessary Being) has the privilege that He must exist if He is possible [Leibniz]