18 ideas
2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
14970 | Normal system K has five axioms and rules [Cresswell] |
14971 | D is valid on every serial frame, but not where there are dead ends [Cresswell] |
14972 | S4 has 14 modalities, and always reduces to a maximum of three modal operators [Cresswell] |
14973 | In S5 all the long complex modalities reduce to just three, and their negations [Cresswell] |
14976 | Reject the Barcan if quantifiers are confined to worlds, and different things exist in other worlds [Cresswell] |
2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
16045 | General facts supervene on particular facts, but cannot be inferred from them [Russell, by Bennett,K] |
14974 | A relation is 'Euclidean' if aRb and aRc imply bRc [Cresswell] |
14327 | Trope theorists cannot explain how tropes resemble each other [Russell, by Mumford] |
14975 | A de dicto necessity is true in all worlds, but not necessarily of the same thing in each world [Cresswell] |
2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |