63 ideas
2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
6961 | An analogy begins to break down as soon as the two cases differ [Hume] |
3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
21285 | Events are baffling before experience, and obvious after experience [Hume] |
2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |
2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
6959 | We can't assume God's perfections are like our ideas or like human attributes [Hume] |
6957 | The objects of theological reasoning are too big for our minds [Hume] |
21255 | No being's non-existence can imply a contradiction, so its existence cannot be proved a priori [Hume] |
1435 | If something must be necessary so that something exists rather than nothing, why can't the universe be necessary? [Hume] |
21254 | A chain of events requires a cause for the whole as well as the parts, yet the chain is just a sum of parts [Hume] |
6962 | The thing which contains order must be God, so see God where you see order [Hume] |
6964 | From our limited view, we cannot tell if the universe is faulty [Hume] |
6967 | Order may come from an irrational source as well as a rational one [Hume] |
21279 | If the divine cause is proportional to its effects, the effects are finite, so the Deity cannot be infinite [Hume] |
21280 | From a ship you would judge its creator a genius, not a mere humble workman [Hume] |
21282 | Design cannot prove a unified Deity. Many men make a city, so why not many gods for a world? [Hume] |
6966 | Creation is more like vegetation than human art, so it won't come from reason [Hume] |
21281 | This excellent world may be the result of a huge sequence of trial-and-error [Hume] |
21283 | Humans renew their species sexually. If there are many gods, would they not do the same? [Hume] |
21284 | This Creator god might be an infant or incompetent or senile [Hume] |
21286 | Motion often begins in matter, with no sign of a controlling agent [Hume] |
21287 | The universe could settle into superficial order, without a designer [Hume] |
21288 | Ideas arise from objects, not vice versa; ideas only influence matter if they are linked [Hume] |
21256 | A surprise feature of all products of 9 looks like design, but is actually a necessity [Hume] |
6960 | Analogy suggests that God has a very great human mind [Hume] |
6963 | Why would we infer an infinite creator from a finite creation? [Hume] |
6958 | How can we pronounce on a whole after a brief look at a very small part? [Hume] |
6965 | The universe may be the result of trial-and-error [Hume] |