Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Realistic Rationalism', 'Universals' and 'The Reality of Numbers'

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz]
Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
Truth and falsehood must track what does or doesn't exist [Bigelow]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
The distinction between particulars and universals is a mistake made because of language [Ramsey]
We could make universals collections of particulars, or particulars collections of their qualities [Ramsey]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Obviously 'Socrates is wise' and 'Socrates has wisdom' express the same fact [Ramsey]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz]