17 ideas
2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
3340 | Von Neumann defines each number as the set of all smaller numbers [Neumann, by Blackburn] |
3355 | Von Neumann wanted mathematical functions to replace sets [Neumann, by Benardete,JA] |
22716 | Von Neumann defined ordinals as the set of all smaller ordinals [Neumann, by Poundstone] |
2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
19743 | A notebook counts as memory, if is available to consciousness and guides our actions [Clark/Chalmers] |
2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
6176 | A mechanism can count as 'cognitive' whether it is in the brain or outside it [Clark/Chalmers, by Rowlands] |
19741 | If something in the world could equally have been a mental process, it is part of our cognition [Clark/Chalmers] |
19742 | Consciousness may not extend beyond the head, but cognition need not be conscious [Clark/Chalmers] |
19744 | If a person relies on their notes, those notes are parted of the extended system which is the person [Clark/Chalmers] |
2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |