Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Realistic Rationalism', 'Aristotle on Matter' and 'The Sense of Reality'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 1. History of Ideas
The great moments are the death of Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Romanticism [Berlin, by Watson]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz]
Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K]
Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K]