21 ideas
| 2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
| 2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
| 9967 | 'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not [Jubien] |
| 23476 | Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell] |
| 23477 | We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell] |
| 18273 | Logical truths are known by their extreme generality [Russell] |
| 9968 | A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities [Jubien] |
| 9965 | There couldn't just be one number, such as 17 [Jubien] |
| 9966 | The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure [Jubien] |
| 2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
| 9963 | If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed [Jubien] |
| 9962 | How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations? [Jubien] |
| 9964 | Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own [Jubien] |
| 22315 | There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence [Potter on Russell] |
| 9969 | The empty set is the purest abstract object [Jubien] |
| 2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
| 2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
| 2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
| 2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
| 2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
| 2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |