Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Realistic Rationalism', 'Introduction to 'Personal Identity'' and 'Theses on Feuerbach'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


18 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz]
Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophers have interpreted the world, but the point is to change it [Marx]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Whether human thinking can be 'true' must be decided in practice, not theory [Marx]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi]
Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
The authentic self exists at the level of class, rather than the individual [Marx, by Dunt]
Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
The human essence is not found in individuals but in social relations [Marx]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religious feeling is social in origin [Marx]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi]