13 ideas
| 2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
| 2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
| 2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
| 2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
| 2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
| 23801 | Biosemantics says content is useful mapping from a producer to a consumer system [Millikan, by Schulte] |
| 2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
| 2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
| 2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
| 2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
| 17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
| 17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |
| 17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |