19 ideas
2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
19456 | Philosophy is distinguished from other sciences by its complete lack of presuppositions [Feuerbach] |
2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
18696 | The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button] |
18701 | The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button] |
18694 | Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button] |
2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
18692 | Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button] |
18693 | Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button] |
18695 | An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button] |
2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
18700 | Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button] |
18698 | Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button] |
2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
18697 | A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button] |
2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |