17 ideas
| 2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
| 2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
| 21642 | If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine] |
| 2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
| 1633 | Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine] |
| 18964 | Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine] |
| 4869 | Experience does not teach us any essences of things [Spinoza] |
| 18965 | We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine] |
| 2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
| 2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
| 1634 | Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory [Quine] |
| 2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
| 8470 | Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
| 2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
| 2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
| 18963 | Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine] |