14 ideas
| 2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
| 2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
| 8203 | All the arithmetical entities can be reduced to classes of integers, and hence to sets [Quine] |
| 2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
| 16045 | General facts supervene on particular facts, but cannot be inferred from them [Russell, by Bennett,K] |
| 14327 | Trope theorists cannot explain how tropes resemble each other [Russell, by Mumford] |
| 2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
| 2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
| 2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
| 8202 | Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words [Quine] |
| 2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
| 2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
| 2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
| 8201 | The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine] |