Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Elm and the Expert', 'The Art of Rhetoric' and 'works'

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55 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Desired responsible actions result either from rational or from irrational desire [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
It is the role of dialectic to survey syllogisms [Aristotle]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Abelard's mereology involves privileged and natural divisions, and principal parts [Abelard, by King,P]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
Abelard was an irrealist about virtually everything apart from concrete individuals [Abelard, by King,P]
If 'animal' is wholly present in Socrates and an ass, then 'animal' is rational and irrational [Abelard, by King,P]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Only words can be 'predicated of many'; the universality is just in its mode of signifying [Abelard, by Panaccio]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
The de dicto-de re modality distinction dates back to Abelard [Abelard, by Orenstein]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor]
Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor]
We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor]
Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
A single counterexample is enough to prove that a truth is not necessary [Aristotle]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Nobody fears a disease which nobody has yet caught [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor]
Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
Abelard's problem is the purely singular aspects of things won't account for abstraction [Panaccio on Abelard]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor]
If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Nothing external can truly be predicated of an object [Abelard, by Panaccio]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Rhetoric is a political offshoot of dialectic and ethics [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Pentathletes look the most beautiful, because they combine speed and strength [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Men are physically prime at thirty-five, and mentally prime at forty-nine [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
We all feel universal right and wrong, independent of any community or contracts [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness is composed of a catalogue of internal and external benefits [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Self-interest is a relative good, but nobility an absolute good [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
All good things can be misused, except virtue [Aristotle]
The best virtues are the most useful to others [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
The young feel pity from philanthropy, but the old from self-concern [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Rich people are mindlessly happy [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
The four constitutions are democracy (freedom), oligarchy (wealth), aristocracy (custom), tyranny (security) [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
It is noble to avenge oneself on one's enemies, and not come to terms with them [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
Natural kinds are not special; they are just well-defined resemblance collections [Abelard, by King,P]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
People assume events cause what follows them [Aristotle]