Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'The Analysis of Mind' and 'Elbow Room: varieties of free will'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
An overexamined life is as bad as an unexamined one [Dennett]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Rationality requires the assumption that things are either for better or worse [Dennett]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
Why pronounce impossible what you cannot imagine? [Dennett]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
In 1921 Russell abandoned sense-data, and the gap between sensation and object [Russell, by Grayling]
Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
It is possible the world came into existence five minutes ago, complete with false memories [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified) [Dennett]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Knowledge needs more than a sensitive response; the response must also be appropriate [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
I am the sum total of what I directly control [Dennett]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
In perception, the self is just a logical fiction demanded by grammar [Russell]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
You can be free even though force would have prevented you doing otherwise [Dennett, by PG]
Can we conceive of a being with a will freer than our own? [Dennett]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Awareness of thought is a step beyond awareness of the world [Dennett]
Foreknowledge permits control [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
The active self is a fiction created because we are ignorant of our motivations [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor]