32 ideas
| 6118 | Philosophy is logical analysis, followed by synthesis [Russell] |
| 6116 | A logical language would show up the fallacy of inferring reality from ordinary language [Russell] |
| 6117 | Philosophy should be built on science, to reduce error [Russell] |
| 12619 | We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor] |
| 15717 | Using Choice, you can cut up a small ball and make an enormous one from the pieces [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
| 6110 | Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages [Russell] |
| 6107 | It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy [Russell] |
| 6115 | Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language [Russell] |
| 6109 | Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions [Russell] |
| 15712 | 1 and 0, then add for naturals, subtract for negatives, divide for rationals, take roots for irrationals [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
| 15711 | The rationals are everywhere - the irrationals are everywhere else [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
| 15714 | 'Commutative' laws say order makes no difference; 'associative' laws say groupings make no difference [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
| 15715 | 'Distributive' laws say if you add then multiply, or multiply then add, you get the same result [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
| 6108 | Maths can be deduced from logical axioms and the logic of relations [Russell] |
| 12620 | If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor] |
| 10968 | Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read] |
| 6113 | To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell] |
| 6114 | 'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell] |
| 21722 | Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell] |
| 6111 | As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell] |
| 12613 | Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor] |
| 12617 | Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor] |
| 15713 | The first million numbers confirm that no number is greater than a million [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
| 12615 | Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor] |
| 6650 | Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe] |
| 12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
| 12614 | I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor] |
| 12621 | Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor] |
| 12622 | Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor] |
| 12623 | The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor] |
| 6112 | Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell] |
| 12616 | English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor] |