Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In a Critical Condition', 'Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy' and 'Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86'

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76 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
The Dao (Way) first means the road, and comes to mean the right way to live [Norden]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Different abilities are needed for living in an incomplete and undogmatic system [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Bad writers use shapeless floating splotches of concepts [Nietzsche]
It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
A text has many interpretations, but no 'correct' one [Nietzsche]
The hermeneutic circle is either within the text, or between text and biased reader [Norden]
Heremeneutics is either 'faith' (examining truth) or 'suspicion' (looking for hidden motives) [Norden]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 2. Transcendental Argument
Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
What is the search for truth if it isn't moral? [Nietzsche]
Like all philosophers, I love truth [Nietzsche]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logic is a fiction, which invents the view that one thought causes another [Nietzsche]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Numbers enable us to manage the world - to the limits of counting [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are just interpretations of groups of appearances [Nietzsche]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
How do you count beliefs? [Fodor]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
The 'I' does not think; it is a construction of thinking, like other useful abstractions [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Appearance is the sole reality of things, to which all predicates refer [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / c. Empirical idealism
Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memory is essential, and is only possible by means of abbreviation signs [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Schematic minds think thoughts are truer if they slot into a scheme [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Each of our personal drives has its own perspective [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
The mind is a simplifying apparatus [Nietzsche]
Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor]
The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Consciousness is our awareness of our own mental life [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Minds have an excluding drive to scare things off, and a selecting one to filter facts [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
The greatest drive of life is to discharge strength, rather than preservation [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
That all events are necessary does not mean they are compelled [Nietzsche]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 3. Modularity of Mind
Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor]
Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor]
Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor]
Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor]
Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor]
Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor]
Modules make the world manageable [Fodor]
Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor]
Rationality rises above modules [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor]
Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor]
Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Concepts are rough groups of simultaneous sensations [Nietzsche]
Concepts don’t match one thing, but many things a little bit [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
Whatever their origin, concepts survive by being useful [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor]
For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Thought starts as ambiguity, in need of interpretation and narrowing [Nietzsche]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Aesthetics can be more basic than morality, in our pleasure in certain patterns of experience [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Caesar and Napoleon point to the future, when they pursue their task regardless of human sacrifice [Nietzsche]
Napoleon was very focused, and rightly ignored compassion [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
For the strongest people, nihilism gives you wings! [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The great question is approaching, of how to govern the earth as a whole [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
The controlling morality of aristocracy is the desire to resemble their ancestors [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
People feel united as a nation by one language, but then want a common ancestry and history [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
To be someone you need property, and wanting more is healthy [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Laws of nature are actually formulas of power relations [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
In chemistry every substance pushes, and thus creates new substances [Nietzsche]